Aircraft Emergencies: Challenge and Response by Burian, Barbara K.
To get an idea of the scope of what we are talking about, I will begin with review of 
5 different emergency or abnormal situations
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• Dallas Text to Toronto, Ontario, Canada – 5 crew members and 41 passengers – in cruise at FL330
• CA reset cbs twice – thought the flush motor was overheated         
• CA did not appear to refer to procedure for resetting cbs in abnormal section of AOM – no reference to this 
procedure on CVR
• FO and FA didn’t clearly communicate that they could not see the source of the fire
• FA’s discharge of CO2 completely ineffective – fire was behind the lavatory wall
• Lost left AC and DC left electrical systems so CA made report to Indy Center
• NTSB estimated that fire had been burning up to 15 minutes before detected by passenger and flight attendants
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Illustration of range of situations – a pack trip is generally pretty benign and easily 
handled – not much increase in stress or workload – some pack trip checklists may 
have more than 4 items
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• Atlanta, GA to Nashville, TN – 5 crew members and 88 passengers
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Example where checklist is inappropriate for the situation – designers did not 
consider variety of situations in which the checklist would be needed
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• Hilo to Honolulu, HI – 5 crew members and 41 passengers – leveling off at 24,000 ft. when decompression 
occurred
• FO reached for oxygen mask and it wasn’t there – had been pulled out of storage compartment by 
decompression and was flopping in the wind behind her seat, still attached by its tubing to the oxygen system
• FO and CA could see blue sky and tail of the aircraft through the open cockpit door 
• One flight attendant lost, one knocked unconscious, the third was crawling up and down the isle on hands and 
knees assisting passengers put on life vests
• Multiple serious injuries for passengers
• FO and CA helped passengers evacuate, some were so bloody that they slipped through hands of FO, CA and 
ARFF when trying to help them up
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Checklists are essential tools that crews use to help them respond appropriately to 
emergency and abnormal situations.  Two examples of checklists – B777 ECL and a 
paper checklist (paper checklists can look very different from this one – this is just 
one example and I used it because it is already in the public domain (included in an 
NTSB accident report). 
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List of checklist design and content areas
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Of course, much more complicated picture – a number of interactions
22
23
24
List of checklist design and content areas pertinent to this accident
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List of checklist design and content areas pertinent to this accident
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• Section of Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated Checklist
• Multiple items make reference to cabin altitude and FL270 – logical coherence issues           
• Inconsistencies in amount of information provided re: identical actions
• “MANUAL CAB ALT” control wheel – FE “cranked it open a couple of times” – NTSB determined it would 
have needed 16 cranks to fully open – difference between simulator and real life
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List of checklist design and content areas pertinent to this accident
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Events:
•During the takeoff roll the CA indicated that his airspeed indicator was not working             
•It appeared to start working properly once the aircraft began to climb but significant discrepancies 
existed between the CA’s, FO’s, and alternate airspeed indicators
•A few seconds later two advisory messages appeared on the EICAS display:  RUDDER RATIO and  
MACH/SPD TRIM
•The overspeed warning clacker sounded
•The center autopilot commanded an 18 degree nose up attitude and the autothrottles went to a very low 
power setting in response to very high airspeeds as indicated on the CA’s PFD             
•The autopilot and autothrottles disengaged and the stall warning “stick shaker” activated
•Great confusion reigned; power was applied and then removed more than once
•The FO selected Altitude Hold in an attempt to level off and give them time to sort out what was going 
on. However, the throttles were at too low of a power setting to maintain altitude
Findings:
•Investigators determined that a pitot tube that provided information to the left Air Data Computer               
(ADC) was most likely completely blocked. The left ADC provided information to the CA’s airspeed 
indicator and the center autopilot
•There was no specific airspeed discrepancy warning on the B757
•The crew did not attempt to clarify the RUDDER RATIO or MACH/SPD TRIM advisories but it is 
unlikely that any related checklists would have proved useful
•Although the crew agreed that the alternate airspeed indicator was correct they continued to try to use 
(and be confused by) airspeed information on the PFDs
31
•The contradictory warnings and indicators were confusing and the center autopilot  and autothrottles 
contributed greatly to their problems at least initially
•The crew did not attempt to fly the aircraft manually and continued to try use automation that did not 
help them (i.e., Altitude Hold)
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